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1. Introduction 
 
Fiscal federalism theory identifies a number of mechanisms via which decentralization 
may lead to improved levels of efficiency in the provision of public goods and services, 
both in terms of allocative and productive efficiency2. Thus, it has been claimed that local 
governments have a better knowledge of their population’s preferences and needs (Oates, 
1972) so that, under certain circumstances, decentralization can ensure a better match 
between political decisions and local preferences (preference-matching argument). Moreover, it is 
believed that decentralization can increase political participation, which in turn should 
ensure that local governments are more responsive to citizen demands than the central 
government tends to be (Shah, 1998). Closely related to this, decentralization is thought to 
increase the degree of political accountability of the government, which should serve as an 
incentive for a government to act in the best interests of its citizens (Seabright, 1996).  
Given these arguments, in recent years several countries have initiated processes of 
decentralization with the aim of improving accountability and efficiency in their provision 
of public goods and services (Stegarescu, 2005). Other factors, such as separatist forces, 
have also promoted decentralization in various countries, including Indonesia and Russia. 
However, the benefits of decentralization need to be contrasted with any potential 
drawbacks before the system can be deemed superior in terms of social welfare and 
efficiency. Fiscal federalism theory has typically identified spillover effects and economies 
of scale as the main disadvantages of decentralization, since they can reduce the efficiency 
with which public goods and services are provided. More recently, Prud’homme (1995) 
claimed that decentralization may lead to higher levels of corruption since local authorities 
are more prone to being captured by local elites than central governments are. However, a 
number of analyses that have analysed the relationship between decentralization and 
lobbying conclude that the effects of decentralization on corruption are ambiguous and 
context-specific, indicating the need for empirical studies (Redoano, 2007; Bardhan and 
Mookherjee, 2000; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005). Thus, the theory remains inconclusive 
regarding the effects of decentralization, and empirical analyses are required.  
Yet despite this need, empirical studies on this issue have, until recently, been virtually 
non-existent. Specifically, the relationship between decentralization and allocative efficiency 
has only been studied in Faguet (2004) and Solé-Ollé and Esteller-Moré (2005). Similarly, 
the literature examining the relationship between decentralization and productive efficiency 
                                                 
2 Productive efficiency is interpreted here in a broad sense to include inefficiencies such as 
corruption, waste and poor governance. 
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remains limited and, more often than not, reports contradictory conclusions. One such 
example is provided by Barankay and Lockwood (2007), who analyse the effects of 
decentralization on the productive efficiency of government in education policy.  
Thus, at a time when decentralization policies are gaining in popularity, we believe it 
timely to undertake additional studies of their effects. Specifically, the aim of this paper is 
to evaluate the effects of decentralization on educational outcomes in Spain. As we see 
below, in the last two decades Spain has been involved in a far-reaching process of 
decentralization to the extent that today it is one of the most decentralized economies in 
Europe. As in many other countries, its education policy has been one of the areas most 
affected by decentralization. And, because of the way in which the process has evolved in 
Spain, we are able to apply the differences-in-differences methodology to estimate its effects. As 
the country’s regions received their educational powers at different points in time, we can 
use the autonomous regions that did not undergo decentralization in each time period as 
the comparison group for the decentralized regions. To do so, we constructed a panel data 
set containing information on the 50 provinces of Spain for the period 1978-2005, a period 
that covers the entire process of decentralization.  
Educational outcomes, here, are measured using the survival rate, defined as the 
proportion of pupils in the final year of lower-secondary (compulsory) education who 
successfully complete the grade and enrol in upper-secondary (non-compulsory) education. 
There are at least two reasons for our interest in the proportion of students who choose to 
remain in full-time education after finishing compulsory education. First, in a country 
where enrolment rates in compulsory education are close to 100%, as is the case in Spain, it 
seems appropriate to use a variable that measures the proportion of students that stay on at 
school after this period to measure educational attainment. Second, and most importantly, 
recent evidence shows that each year a large number of young people in Spain fail to obtain 
the basic school diploma that certifies completion of lower-secondary education, and so are 
unable to proceed to upper-secondary education (Fuentes, 2009). As a consequence, upper-
secondary graduation rates in Spain remain low in international comparisons and, thus, 
raising both lower- and upper-secondary education graduation rates should be now one of 
the main objectives facing educational policy in Spain. 
Our results show that decentralization in Spain has increased the proportion of 
students that enrol in upper-secondary education (Bachillerato) upon completion of lower-
secondary education (ESO). We also find that the richer the Autonomous Community is, 
the greater the positive effects of this decentralization process have been. However, when 
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we include the students that chose to enrol on vocational training programmes upon 
completion of ESO in our survival rate measure, the effects of decentralization are negative 
or non-significant. Given that Bachillerato (a general academic programme) is the chosen 
avenue into upper-secondary education for most ESO graduates, and that the attractiveness 
of vocational education is much lower than that of this general programme, these negative 
effects might reflect a better match between population preferences and educational 
policies consequent upon decentralization. The effects of decentralization on the 
educational sector in Spain have only previously been studied in Solé-Ollé and Esteller-
Moré (2005), where the focus was specifically on the allocative efficiency of 
decentralization. The authors concluded that Spanish decentralization has improved 
allocative efficiency, in both education and road investment, a finding that is line with our 
results here.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a review of the literature 
that has examined the effects of decentralization. Here, fiscal federalism theory has 
advanced a number of arguments in favour and against decentralization, and these serve as 
the theoretical framework for the empirical studies that have sought to verify these 
arguments. Section 3 describes the main features of the educational sector in Spain, with 
particular reference to the decentralization of the system. Section 4 describes the 
methodology we use in the empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses some empirical issues, 
principally the variables that are included in the analysis and our data sources. Section 6 
presents the results we obtain from the analysis. Section 7 provides further analyses to 
corroborate the robustness of our results. Finally, the last section reports the conclusions 
that can be drawn from the analysis. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 The theory 
 
Fiscal federalism theory has traditionally presented decentralization movements as a 
trade-off between potential benefits, in terms of both productive and allocative efficiency, 
and possible drawbacks, that stem from the existence of spillover effects and economies of 
scale.  
The Decentralization Theorem (Oates, 1972) claims that, in the absence of externalities and 
economies of scale, the decentralized provision of public goods will always be preferable in 
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terms of social welfare to that of a centralized provision. This is because it is assumed that 
regional governments are better informed about local preferences and circumstances than 
the central government is, and this ensures that they are more responsive to local needs and 
are better placed to match local preferences with the provision of public goods and services 
(preference-matching argument). Oates’ conclusions are based on the assumption that while 
central government results in a uniform provision of public goods, local governments can 
differentiate between regions on the basis of heterogeneous local tastes and needs. The 
justification for this argument is the limited access central government has to information 
about local circumstances, and the various political problems that may prevent the central 
government from providing access to heterogeneous levels of public goods and services 
between the regions.  
More recently, the political economy literature has relaxed this hypothesis by the 
modelling of legislative behaviour in central government (Lockwood, 2002; Besley and 
Coate, 2003). These studies seem to confirm, however, Oates’ conclusion that 
decentralization is preferable when externalities are small and/or when there exists a high 
degree of heterogeneity between regions. Yet, differences can be identified between the 
two approaches. First, in the new political economy approach, the costs of centralization 
are not derived from a uniform level of provision of public goods, but rather from the 
inefficient spending decisions made by the central legislative body. Secondly, the arguments 
forwarded in support of the belief that centralization improves efficiency in the presence of 
externalities also differ greatly. In Oates’ approach, centralization is preferable under these 
circumstances as the process allows spillover effects to be internalised. However, in the 
political economy literature, externalities influence central government incentives to 
allocate funds efficiently. 
Thus, the general conclusion to be drawn from these theoretical studies is that, if 
externalities are low and districts heterogeneous, decentralization will improve allocative 
efficiency. However, there is an implicit assumption to this proposition that should not be 
overlooked. These studies assume that governments are benevolent, in the sense that they 
act in the best interests of their citizens. This hypothesis, however, has been called into 
question by more than one author in recent years, as governments might very well prioritise 
their own interests or be under the sway of lobbies and rent-seeking groups, resulting in  
reduced productive efficiency. Seabright (1996), for example, has modelled the way in 
which decentralization can affect a government’s incentive to act in the best interests of its 
citizens. This author argues that government incentives depend on the degree of political 
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accountability, defined as the probability that the welfare of a given region might determine 
the re-election of the government. Since political accountability or the electoral control over 
incumbents is greater at the local level, decentralized governments will have more 
incentives than centralized authorities to act in accordance with the preferences of the 
population and, therefore, be less corrupt (accountability argument). Persson and Tabellini 
(2000) and Hindriks and Lockwood (2005) reach similar conclusions about the relationship 
between decentralization, political accountability and government behaviour.  
Despite the above definition of political accountability, the literature usually considers this 
term in a broader sense as the electoral rules and other institutional mechanisms that 
constrain the rent-seeking activities of office holders, such as the taking bribes, favouring 
of particular interest groups and insufficient innovation and effort. Thus, in order to 
determine the impact of decentralization, Lockwood (2006) has proposed focusing on two 
possible aspects of accountability: the degree to which institutions allow the government to 
divert rents, and the degree to which institutions allow special interest groups to distort 
government decision-making through their lobbying activity. In fact, various studies have 
focused on this relationship between decentralization and lobbying, and conclude that the 
effects of decentralization on corruption are ambiguous and context-specific, indicating the 
need for empirical studies (Redoano, 2007; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000; Bardhan and 
Mookherjee, 2005).  
 
2.2 Empirical work 
 
As we have seen, theoretical analyses do not allow us to draw any definitive 
conclusions regarding the superiority of centralised or decentralised systems in terms of 
their respective economic efficiency. Improved political accountability resulting from 
decentralization and increased allocative efficiency must be set against any externalities which 
arise from spillovers between localities. It has also been argued that the combination of the 
decentralization of expenditures and the centralization of tax collection means that 
subcentral governments have an unclear perception of hard budget constraints, which 
causes them to overspend and to be inefficient (Wildasin, 1997). Thus, the net benefits of 
decentralization are likely to vary between policies and localities, so that the choice between 
centralized and decentralized forms of government is highly sensitive (Seabright, 1996) and  
probably context specific, which makes empirical studies necessary. However, the empirical 
literature examining the effects of decentralization on both allocative and productive 
6
efficiency has, until recently, been virtually non-existent and, indeed, continues to be 
somewhat scarce.  
Faguet (2004) and Solé-Ollé and Esteller-Moré (2005) examine the influence of 
decentralization on allocative efficiency by determining whether the process has had an impact 
on investment patterns (across Bolivian municipalities in the first instance and Spanish 
provinces in the second), and the extent to which these changes could be related to 
objective measures of needs. Both studies conclude that decentralization has led to a better 
adjustment between investment patterns and needs, corroborating one of the main theories 
of fiscal federalism. However, Akin et al. (2005), in their analysis of the allocation of funds 
between public and non-public goods in Uganda, conclude that the regional governments 
tend to allocate fewer resources than the central government to public good activities, 
implying that social welfare is weakened with decentralization.   
Most of the empirical literature analysing the impact of decentralization on productive 
efficiency has not attempted to identify with any degree of precision the particular channels 
discussed above. Rather, as discussed by Barankay and Lockwood (2007), the general 
approach has involved examining the relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
certain key observable factors of governance, such as measures of outcomes in a given 
policy area or political, economic or social indicators. In the education sector, which is the 
focus of the present study, Habibi et al. (2001) report a positive impact of decentralization 
on educational outcomes in Argentina when using the ratio of students enrolled in 
secondary school per thousand primary students as their dependent variable. Likewise, 
Galiani and Schargrodsky (2001) and Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky (2008) find a 
positive impact of decentralization in the same country on educational outcomes (measured 
using the standardized test scores of Argentine students), but only in provinces that do not 
report a very large fiscal deficit. Similar results are reported in Barankay and Lockwood 
(2007) in their analysis of the effects of decentralization on educational attainment 
(measured according to the maturité rate, i.e., the ratio between the number of students 
obtaining the university entrance qualification and the number of 19 year olds in the 
population) in the Swiss cantons. Faguet and Sanchez (2008) also present evidence of 
improved educational outcomes in Colombia (measured as the year-on-year increase in 
student enrolment) as a result of decentralization. However, the literature also reports 
instances in which decentralization has no impact on educational outcomes. This is the case 
of Mahal et al. (2000), who even report negative effects of decentralization on primary 
health care and education in India, and Treisman (2002), who analyses the effects of 
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decentralization on youth illiteracy rates, as a measure of the quality of public services in 
basic education, for a cross-section of 91 countries.  
Finally, the several studies that have examined the relationship between decentralization 
and corruption also report contradictory findings. While Treisman (2002) presents quite 
convincing evidence to suggest that decentralization leads to higher levels of perceived 
corruption, Fisman and Gatti (2001) and Huther and Shah (1998) conclude just the 
opposite.  
Thus, reports regarding the effects of decentralization on government quality and 
educational outcomes are somewhat contradictory. Given these contradictions, and the fact 
that the case of Spain has only been analysed in Solé-Ollé and Esteller-Moré (2005), and 
then solely in terms of allocative efficiency, we consider an empirical analysis of the effects 
of decentralization on educational outcomes in Spain to be of great interest.  
 
3. The main features of the education sector in Spain 
 
3.1 Spain’s education system 
 
The education system in Spain has undergone several reforms during the last thirty 
years, in response to the changing needs of an economy that has developed greatly during 
this period. In 1970, the Ley General de Educación (LGE) made education free and 
compulsory until the age of 14. In addition, the law introduced vocational training into the 
education system as an alternative pathway to academic study upon completion of 
compulsory education and to facilitate young people’s entry into the labour market. In 
1985, the Ley Orgánica Reguladora del Derecho a la Educación created the state-assisted schools, 
which combined free education (in private schools) with parental discretion regarding the 
school to which they could send their children. However, the basic structure of the 
education system was not altered until 1990, when the Ley Orgánica de Ordenación General del 
Sistema Educativo (LOGSE) extended compulsory education to the age of 16, and created 
advanced vocational training schools.  
Despite this reform, and the compulsory extension of school attendance to the age of 
16, each year a large number of youths fail to obtain the basic school diploma certifying 
successful completion of ESO. Given that these pupils cannot therefore proceed to upper-
secondary education, a large number of unskilled workers enter the Spanish labour market. 
Further, the net enrolment rates in upper-secondary education in Spain are lower than 
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those in most other European countries as are Spain’s graduation rates when compared 
internationally (Fuentes, 2009). Only Luxemburg, Portugal and the United Kingdom 
figured below Spain in 2004 in terms of their net enrolment rates at the age of 18, while 
there was a gap of more than twenty percent with Finland and Sweden, which had net 
enrolment rates above 90 percent. However, marked differences can be observed between 
the regions of Spain. Thus, in 2004, while the net enrolment rate at the age of 17 was 92.6 
percent in País Vasco, in line with Europe’s best performing countries, it was only 61.1 
percent in Baleares.  
Enrolment on vocational training programmes is lower than that on general academic 
programmes in all the regions of Spain. This is mainly because the educational pathway 
Bachillerato is the favoured route for admission into university, but it may also reflect the 
high failure rate of pupils in lower-secondary education, which is likely to depress 
participation of vocationally interested pupils in upper-secondary education. As a 
consequence, graduation rates for vocationally-oriented degrees are also very low when 
compared internationally.        
Thus, one of the main challenges that the Spanish education system currently faces is 
how to raise its number of upper-secondary education graduates. As signalled in several 
studies, this first requires reducing the number of youths who are unable to proceed to 
upper-secondary education because they fail to obtain the basic school diploma that 
certifies completion of lower-secondary education. Although we do not have data on early 
school leavers, we can compute the proportion of students enrolled in the final year of 
lower-secondary education (i.e.,  compulsory education) who choose to remain at school to 
study upper-secondary education as full-time students. A similar measure has been used in 
Pissarides (1981) to analyse the demand for post-compulsory education in England and 
Wales. Likewise, the OECD used a similar measure in Education at a Glance 1992, to analyse 
higher education survival (OECD, 1992).  
 
3.2 Decentralization process  
 
We can trace the process of decentralization in Spain back to 1978, when the Spanish 
Constitution was enacted. The 1978 Constitution clearly laid down the foundations that 
would enable Spain to become one of the most decentralized economies in Europe. Thus, 
it established the right of Spanish provinces to unite to form autonomous regions (17 Self-
governing Communities were formed from the 50 provinces) and specified the division of 
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powers between the central government and the new autonomous or regional 
governments. In the education sector, the Constitution upheld the central government’s 
power to define the structure of the state’s education system, to regulate the requirements 
for the obtaining, issue and standardization of academic degrees and professional 
qualifications and to establish the basic rules to guarantee the unity of the Spanish 
education system. All other responsibilities in the sector, however, were devolved to the 
regional governments.  
One of the main features of Spain’s process of decentralization has been the 
asymmetrical manner in which it has been conducted (García-Milà and McGuire, 2002). 
While provinces with common historic, cultural and economic characteristics, islands and 
provinces with a historic regional status were able to accede to all the powers not 
specifically assigned to the central government in the Constitution (section 149) following 
the approval of their Devolution Statutes (that is, Cataluña, País Vasco, Galicia, Andalucía, 
Comunidad Valenciana and Canarias), the other autonomous regions had to wait five years 
following the approval of their Devolution Statutes to be assigned the same powers. In 
practice, however, these non historic autonomous regions were not able to receive these 
educational powers until the approval of the Acuerdos Autonómicos de ampliación de competencias 
in 1992, and the transfers were not made effective until the final years of the nineties. As a 
result, the decentralization process has taken place over almost two decades, but today all 
the autonomous regions enjoy the same powers in the education sector. Table 1 shows the 
year in which the individual Statutes of Autonomy were introduced in each Autonomous 
Community and the year in which educational powers were transferred to them. The fact 
that the different regions received these educational powers at different points in time 
allows us to estimate the effect of decentralization on educational outcomes by using the 
autonomous communities that are not decentralized as a comparison group for the regions 
that are decentralized in each time period.   
 
4. Methodology 
 
The aim of this study is to evaluate the effects of decentralization in Spain on the 
country’s educational outcomes. As in the evaluation of any policy area, the effect of 
decentralization in any region i is given by the difference between the outcomes in this 
region at time t after decentralization and the outcomes in this region had it not been 
decentralized: 
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 α = −D NDit it itY Y  (1) 
 
where itα  denotes the individual-specific treatment effect, DitY  denotes the outcomes 
in the treated group of regions if decentralized, and NDitY  the outcomes in the treated 
group of regions had they not received educational powers (Blundell and Costa Dias, 
2002). However, as it is impossible to observe what would have happened had 
decentralization not taken place in a particular region, NDiY  is non-observable and has to 
be estimated. When experimental data are available, the outcomes in the non-treated 
regions can be used to approximate NDiY . In our study, although we do not have any 
experimental data, we are fortunate that educational powers were devolved to the regions 
at different points in time. Thus, we can use the outcomes in the non-decentralized regions 
to estimate what would have happened in the decentralized regions had they not been 
decentralized. Although the decision to decentralize was made on historical grounds, so 
that should not have been affected by any specific regional characteristics with an influence 
also on the educational outcomes, we apply the differences-in-differences methodology to 
estimate its effects. In this way, we are able to control for differences between regions in 
terms of the non-observable characteristics that might determine both student outcomes 
and the desire of regional governments to be granted powers in the field of education. For 
example, the importance attached to education in a given society. If such differences were 
to exist and we did not control for them, a non-zero correlation between the 
decentralization variable and the error term in the outcome equation would appear, and our 
estimates of the impact of decentralization would be affected by a selection bias (Heckman 
and Hotz, 1989).  
The differences-in-differences method enables us to control for such differences by 
decomposing the error term in the outcomes equation on a region-specific fixed effect, 
iΦ , a common macro-economic effect, tθ , and a temporary individual-specific effect, itε  
(Blundell and Costa Dias, 2002), as we can see in equation (2):  
 
( )it it i t itY d α θ ε= + Φ + +  (2) 
 
where iΦ  includes the unobservable or non-measurable characteristics of provinces 
that may have an influence both on educational outcomes and on the decision whether to 
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decentralize or not; tθ  allows us to control also for the temporary shocks that affect the 
outcomes of all provinces equally (for example, a central government reform); and itd  is 
the decentralization variable, which is defined with a dummy that takes the values 1 if the 
province i is in a decentralized Autonomous Community in year t, and 0 otherwise. We 
consider this variable to be appropriate in the case of Spain, where the decentralization of 
spending in education has also meant devolution in decision-making powers to the 
Autonomous Communities. Under these circumstances, the only assumption that we need 
so as to identify the effect of decentralization on educational outcomes, α , is that selection 
into treatment is independent of the temporary individual-specific effect. This ensures that 
the evolution of the outcomes in non-decentralized regions is the same as they would have 
been in decentralized regions had the latter not been decentralized:  
 
( ) ( )1 0 1 0,D D ND NDt t t tY Y Y Y D− − ⊥  (3) 
 
If this assumption is valid, the estimation of equation (2) for the pooled sample of 
decentralized and non-decentralized autonomous regions leads to the Average Treatment 
Effect on the Treated (ATET), which can be represented as follows: 
 
( ) ( )1 0 1 0D D ND NDt t t tY Y Y Yα = − − −  (4) 
 
where α  denotes the ATET, ( )0 1,D Dt tY Y  denote the outcomes for the treated group of 
regions before and after the reform, respectively, and ( )0 1,ND NDt tY Y  the outcomes of the 
control group of regions also before and after the reform. Thus, the differences-in-differences 
estimator measures the excess outcome growth for the treated compared to the non-treated 
regions (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000).  
Given that in Spain the devolution of powers was decided on historical grounds, we do 
not expect the selection process to have been affected by the observable characteristics of 
the regions. However, differences between the two groups of regions could appear simply 
because of the fact we are dealing with only 17 Autonomous Regions in Spain. We can 
assess the importance of this non-random selection in base to the observable characteristics 
of the regions by simple comparison of these characteristics in the two groups of regions 
before decentralization was initiated. Should it be the case that before treatment 
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decentralized and non-decentralized regions presented systematic differences in their 
observable characteristics that might be considered as being associated with the dynamics 
of the outcome variable, these then ought to be included in the regression to solve the 
selection problem (Abadie, 2005). When these control variables are included in equation (2) 
we obtain the so-called linear matching with differences-in-differences estimator, which was first 
proposed by Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998). By including these control 
variables in the regression we ensure that we are comparing the outcomes of decentralized 
regions with the outcomes in non-decentralized regions that have similar observable 
characteristics, and thus, which would respond in the same way to the decentralization 
policy. In that case, assumption (3) above continues to be valid, but only conditional on the 
observable characteristics of the regions included in the regression function, X : 
 
( ) ( )1 0 1 0, |D D ND NDt t t tY Y Y Y D X− − ⊥  (5) 
 
This is the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) needed for the matching 
estimator to be consistent, on a redefined outcome variable, namely the growth in the 
outcomes. However, this is a weaker assumption than CIA, in that there is scope for 
selection both on observables and non-observable characteristics, as long as these are fixed 
over time and additively separable. As we have seen, this model allows any kind of 
dependence between selection for treatment, itd , and the region-specific component, iΦ , 
i.e., it allows for fixed effects. Thus, we first need to take first differences to get rid of the 
regional fixed effects in order to identify the rest of the parameters, and then to apply 
pooled OLS to the differences equation (Wooldridge, 2002). We compute robust variance 
estimates and conduct our estimations by clustering the error term by autonomous 
communities, in order to adjust the standard errors for intragroup correlation (between 
provinces in the same autonomous community) and to obtain a variance covariance matrix 
which is consistent in the presence of any correlation pattern within regions over time 
(Bertrand et al., 2004).  
By employing this method, we obtain consistent estimators under the assumption of 
strict exogeneity of the regressors. As we have seen, when selection depends only on the 
non-observable characteristics of the regions that are constant over time, the 
decomposition of the error term implied by the differences-in-differences approach implies the 
strict exogeneity of the decentralization variable, and our estimations will be consistent. If 
other control variables must be included in the regression, these variables must also 
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accomplish the strict exogeneity assumption for their coefficients to be consistently 
estimated. Since the educational process is cumulative, we need to include the first lag of 
the outcomes variable in order to control for past educational inputs (Todd and Wolpin, 
2003) and to avoid any kind of correlation between the error term and the past, present and 
future values of the explanatory variables.  
 
5. Empirical issues 
 
5.1.  Variables 
 
The main objective of this empirical study is to analyse the effects of the 
decentralization of education in Spain on educational attainment. Several variables have 
been proposed in the literature to measure educational attainment, including: the net 
enrolment rate (Mahal et al., 2000), average test scores in Language and Maths (Galiani and 
Schargrodsky, 2001) and the ratio between the number of students obtaining the university 
entrance qualification and the number of 19 year olds in the population (Barankay and 
Lockwood, 2007). Here, we measure educational attainment by using the survival rate, 
defined as the ratio between the number of students that choose to stay on at school to 
study Bachillerato (non-compulsory) and the number of students enrolled in the final year of 
lower-secondary (compulsory) education in each province (in the previous year). As an 
alternative measure of educational outcomes, we also define a survival rate that not only 
includes pupils who enrol for Bachillerato upon completion of their compulsory education, 
but also those that enrol on vocational training programmes. Habibi et al. (2001) used a 
similar measure, defined as the ratio of students enrolled in secondary school per thousand 
primary school students. Similarly, Pissarides (1981) defines a similar measure to analyse 
the demand for post-compulsory education in England and Wales. In a country where 
enrolment rates in compulsory education are close to 100%, as is the case in Spain, it seems 
appropriate to use a variable that measures the proportion of students that stay on at 
school after this period to measure educational attainment. 
The literature contains a wide-ranging debate regarding the best determinants of 
educational attainment, but its conclusions are not always clear. According to Hanusheck’s 
meta-analyses (1986; 2003) school inputs are not significant in explaining educational 
attainment, at least insofar as they are typically measured in the literature. Rather, family 
characteristics – including income, parental education or family structure, have been found 
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to be of greater importance in accounting for educational outcomes. However, recent 
empirical studies of the effects of class size on educational attainment, based on 
experimental data (Krueger, 1999), instrumental variables methods (Angrist and Lavy, 
1999) and on a very rich data set that allowed the main potential endogeneity problems 
affecting the education production functions to be eliminated (Rivkin et al., 2005), suggest 
that class size reductions have a positive and significant effect on educational attainment. 
The most likely reason why these studies reach such different conclusions is that the 
statistical models used in estimating these relationships are misspecified and fail to account 
for the major determinants of achievement. When analysing the cognitive achievement of 
children, it is essential to have access to data regarding all past and present family and 
school inputs. Since the researcher typically does not enjoy access to such data, highly 
restrictive assumptions are needed to justify some of the specifications that are commonly 
used in the literature, mainly the contemporaneous specification and the value added 
specification. The main problem of the contemporaneous specification is that all past 
school and family inputs are omitted in the regression, which probably results in biased and 
inconsistent estimates unless highly restrictive and non reasonable assumptions are fulfilled. 
By contrast, the value-added specification can lead to consistent estimates under the 
assumption that a lagged outcome variable provides a sufficient statistic for all historical 
inputs, but only when contemporaneous inputs have not been omitted (Todd and Wolpin, 
2003).  
As we have seen, to obtain consistent estimates of the effects of decentralization we 
only need to include the determinants of educational outcomes if there were pre-treatment 
differences in the decentralized and non decentralized regions. Thus, we first need to 
determine whether in Spain in 1980 there were any differences in these variables between 
the regions that would be decentralized in the eighties and those that would be 
decentralized at a later date in the following decade. In line with previous discussions of 
education production functions, we consider the potential determinants of educational 
attainment in Spain to be the pupil/teacher ratio, as a measure of school inputs; per capita 
income and the schooling of the active population, as measures of family inputs or 
characteristics; the unemployment rate as being representative of the broader context of the 
educational sector; and the first lag of the survival rate, as a measure of past school and 
family inputs. If we were to include these variables in the regression, we would expect the 
coefficient of the pupil/teacher ratio to be negative, whereby the lower the pupil/teacher ratio 
is, the better the educational outcomes are. Family characteristics, measured by per capita 
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income and schooling variables, are expected to have a positive influence on educational 
outcomes. First, we suppose that low income families are not able to spend as much as 
high income families are on their children’s education (for example, paying for private 
lessons), and that this will negatively affect a child’s educational attainment as defined 
above. In addition, school pupils from low income families may have to spend more time 
working than their higher income counterparts, and this might also have an impact on their 
educational attainment. Second, family background has also been demonstrated to have a 
positive influence on a child’s school performance, as it would seem that more highly 
educated parents attach greater importance to education than less educated parents tend to 
do. The unemployment rate can influence pupils’ decision making, in the sense that a high 
unemployment rate will encourage them to stay on at school after finishing compulsory 
education. Although the omission of contemporaneous inputs could affect the coefficient 
of the input variables, we would expect the coefficient of the decentralization variable not 
to be affected by this problem, since it should not be correlated with the omitted variables.  
 
5.2.  Data sources and definition of variables 
 
The data consist of a panel data set incorporating the 50 provinces of Spain. Given that 
the decentralization process in Spain was set in motion at the beginning of the eighties and 
finished at the end of the nineties, we analyse the period 1978-2005. In this way, we have 
observations both before and after the decentralization process, as is required in order to 
apply the differences-in-differences estimation method.  
The survival rate is defined as the ratio between the number of students in each province 
that are enrolled in upper-secondary education and the number of students who were 
enrolled in the final year of lower-secondary education (one year before). This variable 
seeks, therefore, to measure the proportion of final-year ESO students who stay on at 
school and study the Bachillerato. We also consider a survival rate which includes both those 
pupils that enrol in Bachillerato and those that enrol on Vocational Training Cycles upon 
completion of ESO. Both measures of the survival rate include pupils in public and private 
schools. This is done for two reasons: first, because we can expect decentralization to 
affect education outcomes in private schools too, since state-assisted schools are also 
included in this group3. Second, if we restrict the measurement of the survival rate to public 
schools, the variable will be affected by pupils transferring from private schools on 
                                                 
3 We verify this by estimating the effects of decentralization for public and private schools 
separately.  
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completing compulsory education. Indeed, compulsory education is subsidised in most 
private schools (with the state paying a large part of the costs); however, this is not the case 
for non-compulsory education, and so some parents choose to transfer their children from 
the private to the public sector at this juncture. These circumstances will tend to lead to an 
overstating of the proportion of students who enrol in upper-secondary education after 
finishing compulsory education in public schools. However, we can also assume that the 
greater the number of pupils transferring from private schools, the better the quality of 
public education must be, as otherwise these students would have preferred to stay in the 
private sector. Thus, an increase in the survival rate caused by this flux of students from the 
private to the public sector may be interpreted as an indication of an improvement in the 
quality of education in public schools. 
The data describing the number of pupils enrolled in each course were obtained from 
the Education Annuals published by the National Statistics Institute until 1985 and by the 
Ministry of Education and Science for all years after that date. The same annuals provide 
information on the number of teachers in secondary education, which is used to compute 
the pupil/teacher ratio. Thus, the pupil/teacher ratio variable is an average of the number of 
pupils per teacher in lower-secondary education, upper-secondary education and vocational 
training programmes, since it is not possible to obtain more disaggregated data.  
The per capita income series, measured in thousands of euros at 1990, is constructed from 
data published by the Fundación BBVA (period 1978-1986) and from the Regional Accounts 
published by the National Statistics Institute (period 1986-2005). The schooling variable, defined 
as the percentage of the working population holding a university degree, was calculated 
from the human capital series published by the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas 
(IVIE) and the Fundación BBVA. The unemployment rate that we use to obtain the results 
presented in this paper is the overall unemployment rate, although we obtain similar results 
with alternative measures of this statistic. These data are also obtained from the human 
capital series published by the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) and the 
Fundación BBVA.  
Finally, the decentralization dummy was constructed from the legislative acts providing for 
the transfer of educational powers from the central to the regional governments, and 
published in the Boletín Oficial del Estado (BOE). It takes a value of 1 if province i lies in a 
decentralized Autonomous Community in year t, and 0 otherwise. Alternatively, we define 
a series of program indicators jitd , which take a value of 1 if province i in time t has been 
in the program exactly j years (and zero otherwise) when 1, 2, ( 1)j J= −… , and a value of 
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1 if province i in time t has been in the program j or more years (and zero otherwise) when 
j J= . In this way, we obtain a more flexible specification, which allows us to consider the 
possibility that the effects of decentralization on the survival rate depend on the number of 
years since decentralization of competences took place. Finally, we also define separate 
indicators for the regions that were decentralized during the eighties and the regions that 
were decentralized during the nineties. Given the different context in which educational 
powers were devolved to these two groups of regions, and the differing levels of 
experience of the governments on receiving them, we can expect the effects of the 
decentralization policy to be different. 
 
6. Results 
 
6.1.  Analysis of differences between regions before decentralization 
 
One of the main features of the Spanish process of decentralization has been the 
asymmetrical manner in which it has been conducted. While provinces with common 
historic, cultural and economic characteristics, islands and provinces with a historic regional 
status were able to accede to all the educational powers not specifically assigned to the 
central government in the Constitution at the beginning of the eighties, the other 
autonomous regions had to wait until the end of the nineties to receive the same powers. 
This feature of the decentralization process allows us to estimate the effect of 
decentralization on educational attainment by using the autonomous communities that are 
not decentralized as a comparison group for the regions that are decentralized in each time 
period. However, in order to ensure the consistent estimation, we need to control for any 
observable or non-observable variables that might have differed between the treated and 
the comparison group before decentralization, and which might also influence the 
evolution in educational outcomes. Although we do not expect such differences to exist in 
Spain, since the pathway taken by the decentralization process was decided on the basis of 
historical characteristics of the regions, we use the differences-in-differences estimation method, 
which accounts for any unobservable characteristics of the regions which may determine 
both student outcomes and the desire of regional governments to be granted powers in the 
field of education. Thus, we only need to analyse if, before the decentralization process 
started, there existed differences in the observable characteristics of the regions which may 
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determine their educational attainment. If there are no differences, as we would expect, the 
group of regions that were decentralized in the eighties will be statistically equivalent to the 
group of regions decentralized in the nineties in all dimensions except their treatment 
status, and we can use the differences-in-differences method to estimate the effect of 
decentralization. If there are differences in the observable characteristics of the regions, we 
only need to include them in the regression in order to identify the parameter of interest, 
thus obtaining the generalized differences-in-differences or linear-matching differences-in-differences 
estimator.  
In Table 2 we compare the characteristics of the two groups of regions that might 
influence the evolution in their educational outcomes, before the decentralization process 
was set in motion, i.e. for the year 1980. As expected, no statistically significant differences 
can be appreciated for any of the variables being compared. Thus, we can conclude that the 
determinants of educational attainment did not influence inclusion in the decentralization 
process in Spain. As a consequence, we can consistently estimate the effects of 
decentralization without including any control variables in the regression, that is, by using 
the differences-in-differences estimation method. 
 
6.2.  Regression analysis  
 
In what follows we present the differences-in-differences estimator of the effects of 
decentralization on educational attainment in Spain. Since the decentralization process in 
Spain began at the start of the eighties and terminated at the end of the nineties, we use a 
panel data set comprising the 50 provinces of  Spain for the period 1978-2005. In this way, 
we include observations both before and after decentralization, as is required when 
applying the differences-in-differences estimation method. Educational attainment is measured 
using  two alternative variables. Both variables are measures of the survival rate, defined as 
the ratio between the number of pupils that enrol in upper-secondary (non-compulsory) 
education and those that were enrolled in the final year of lower-secondary (compulsory) 
education one year before. The only difference in the two variables is that one does not 
include those pupils that enrolled on vocational training programmes upon completion of 
their compulsory education (labelled in the tables of results as “Without VT”), while the 
other variable does (labelled as “With VT”). Decentralization is measured with the 
decentralization dummy variable as defined above, which takes the value of 1 when the 
province i is in a decentralized autonomous region at time t and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 3 shows the results we obtained from this analysis. As can be seen in column 1, 
the effect of decentralization on the survival rate “without VT” is positive and significant. 
Thus, according to these results, the decentralization process increased the survival rate in a 
province by an average of more than 1.6 percent. However, when the survival rate measure 
includes pupils that enrolled on vocational training programmes after finishing compulsory 
education (column 2), decentralization appears as a non significant factor in explaining 
educational attainment.  
However, we should bear in mind that this is an average impact across regions, while 
decentralization would have had heterogeneous effects. Since the regions of Spain are 
highly heterogeneous in terms of some of their characteristics, a reform that has a positive 
effect in one region might well have the opposite effect in another region. Although we 
cannot identify the effects of the treatment on every region i, in columns 3 and 4 we do 
analyse whether the effects of decentralization depend on the per capita income and the per 
capita public revenues of the regions4, by including interaction terms between the 
decentralization dummy and these two variables. Given the previous evidence reported on 
this issue (Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2001; Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky, 2008; 
Barankay and Lockwood, 2007), we would expect the effects of decentralization to be 
greater in the richer regions. Effectively, when vocational training pupils are not included in 
the survival rate (column 3), the coefficient on the interaction term between the 
decentralization and the per capita income variables is positive and significant, although the 
decentralization dummy coefficient is no longer significant. Thus, if we suppose that the per 
capita income in a region is 12.83 thousands of euros (as in Madrid in 2000, when it received 
its educational powers), the effect of decentralization would be to increase the survival rate 
by 3.32 percent. However, if the per capita income in a region is 7.48 thousands of euros 
(as in Extremadura in 2000, when it received its education powers), the effect of 
decentralizing the education policy would be to increase the survival rate by 1.93 percent. By 
contrast, in column 4, where the survival rate measure also includes vocational training 
pupils, the interaction term between per capita income and decentralization does not show 
a significant effect. Rather, the decentralization variable coefficient now presents a negative 
sign and it is significant. As discussed above, vocational training programmes are not as 
attractive to the population as the general programmes are. Thus, these results appear to 
                                                 
4 The amount of public revenues at the disposal of the regional governments includes tax revenues and 
central government transfers (excepting transfers for specific services others than education). In the 
case of Pais Vasco and Navarra, which have a different funding system, public revenues are 
obtained as the difference between tax revenues and the transfers to the central government (data 
from BADESPE).  
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show how regional governments respond to public preferences, by trying to increase 
enrolment rates on general programmes, while in all probability neglecting vocational 
training programmes. Finally, our results show that the effects of decentralization do not 
vary with the level of a region’s public revenues.  
 
6.3.  Alternative measures of decentralization  
 
Although by using the decentralization dummy variable we can consistently estimate 
the ATET, a more flexible specification can be obtained by replacing the dummy variable 
with a series of indicators jitd , which take a value of 1 if province i in time t has been in the 
program exactly j years (and zero otherwise) when 1,2, ( 1)j J= −… , and a value of 1 if 
province i in time t has been in the program j or more years (and zero otherwise) when 
j J= . In this way, we allow the effects of decentralization to depend on the number of 
years that have passed since measures of decentralization were introduced in each region. 
Table 4 presents our results when we estimate this specification in columns 1 and 2. In 
column 1 we can observe that in the first year in which decentralization is initiated (year of 
decentralization), there is an increase in the survival rate without VT of more than 1.6 percent, 
an effect that is also captured by the single dummy variable (Table 3). However, it is also 
observed that decentralization now has an increasing positive impact on the survival rate 
measure in the years that follow. This means that, although decentralization has a positive 
impact on the survival rate without VT from the first year in which it is set in motion, the 
effect increases as the regional governments have time to implement various measures that 
can improve educational attainment or as the impact of these measures makes itself felt on 
the survival rate.  
A further result of interest, and one that is captured by this table, is the fact that when 
using this more flexible specification we also appreciate a negative impact of 
decentralization on the survival rate that includes pupils who enrol on vocational training 
programmes upon completion of compulsory education. Since these negative effects 
appear after the first year of decentralization, they are not captured by the single dummy 
variable. However, we can see that the negative coefficients of the decentralization 
indicators diminish in absolute value with the passing of the years, and are only significant 
in the two years immediately following decentralization.  
Given these results, we can conclude again that the decentralization policy has had a 
positive effect on the proportion of pupils that enrol in Bachillerato upon completion of 
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lower-secondary education. As we have seen, incrementing this rate is one of the main 
challenges currently facing the Spanish education system, so that it might in turn increment 
its upper-secondary graduation rates, which remain relatively low when compared 
internationally. However, the negative impact of decentralization on the survival rate that 
includes pupils on vocational training programmes (at least during the first few years) is not 
so encouraging. This result would seem to reflect two factors. On the one hand, it might be 
the case that following decentralization regional governments decided to introduce stricter 
rules within the educational system. Although such measures seem to have achieved the 
objective of increasing the proportion of pupils that enrol in Bachillerato upon completion 
of compulsory education, it is possible that, at the same time, pupils that otherwise would 
have enrolled on vocational training programmes have been unable to obtain the lower-
secondary education certificate. On the other hand, these results might reflect a better 
match between public preferences and education policy. Since vocational training 
programmes are generally less attractive to pupils than the general educational programmes, 
regional governments might have concentrated their efforts and resources on improving 
the latter programmes, which at the same time could have had a negative impact on 
enrolment in vocational training programmes during the first few years of decentralization.   
Up to this juncture, we have analysed the combined effects of decentralization in those 
regions that received decentralized powers at the beginning of the eighties and those that 
received these competences at the end of the nineties. A more detailed insight of the 
effects of decentralization can be obtained by analysing the effects on the two groups of 
regions separately, since they are not necessarily the same: first, because at the beginning of 
the eighties the autonomous regions had just been created, while at the end of the nineties 
the regional governments had acquired almost twenty years of operational experience; and 
second, because the social, economic and financial contexts were very different in the two 
periods. To do this, we created two new sets of indicators, _ 80 jitTreated  and _ 90 jitTreated , 
which identify decentralization in the two groups of regions separately. We present the 
results of using separate indicators for each group in columns 3 to 6 of Table 4. As 
expected, the estimated effects of decentralization differed between the two groups of 
regions. First, while in regions that were decentralized at the beginning of the eighties the 
process recorded its full impact on the survival rate without VT during the year of 
decentralization, in regions that were decentralized at the end of the nineties the effects of 
decentralization were not significant until three years after decentralization. However, from 
this moment the impact of decentralization was increasingly positive. A possible 
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explanation for this difference is that, when at the beginning of the eighties the regions 
received their educational competences reform was urgently needed, such reforms were not 
so obvious at the end of the nineties. Thus, changes were only introduced later or, it might 
be the case that their effects took longer to be noticed. Whatever the explanation, the 
effects appear to be more significant at the end of the nineties, perhaps reflecting the 
greater experience acquired by regional governments in the intervening decade. Second, the 
negative impact of decentralisation on the survival rate with VT students was recorded only 
at the end of the nineties, and was not significant at the beginning of the eighties. This 
negative effect, however, only remained significant in the three years following 
decentralization, and disappeared in the fourth year.  
Thus, what can be concluded from these results is that, at the beginning of the eighties, 
decentralization only had a positive effect on the survival rate without VT, and that this was 
felt immediately during the first year of decentralization. By contrast, at the end of the 
nineties, decentralization had a negative impact on the proportion of pupils that enrolled in 
vocational training programmes. However, three years after decentralization this negative 
impact started to be offset by the positive impact on the proportion of pupils that were 
enrolling in Bachillerato, and after four years the impact had been fully countered, so that the 
overall effect was not significant. 
  
6.4.  Regression analysis by sex and by type of institution 
 
Up to this juncture, we have analysed public and private schools together, and we have 
not distinguished between male and female students. One reason for this analysis is that 
private schools include Spain’s state-assisted schools, which as such are also affected by 
government education policies. A second reason was to avoid the measurement problem 
that the transfer of pupils between public and private schools could cause for our outcome 
variable. However, it is interesting to analyse the effects of decentralization separately for 
both public and private schools and for male and female students. In this way, we should 
be able to determine whether decentralization has had any impact on the survival rate in 
private schools. Likewise, as we can interpret any increase in the survival rate in public 
schools (because of pupils transferring from private schools) as a sign of an improvement 
in the quality of public education quality, it is also interesting to conduct the analysis for 
public schools separately. Similarly, it is interesting to see if male and female students 
respond distinctly to a policy change such as those ushered in by decentralization. These 
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results are summarised in Table 5. Panel A shows the results when the dependent variable 
is the male survival rate, and Panel B the results when the dependent variable is the female 
survival rate. In columns 1 and 2 we include all schools (public and private), while in 
columns 3 and 4 only public schools are included. The effect of decentralization on the 
survival rate in private schools is not shown because it is always non significant. Thus, 
despite the fact that most private schools are publicly funded, the decentralization process 
in Spain had no effect on their survival rate. However, this is not the same as saying that it 
had no effect on educational attainment in private schools, just that the proportion of 
students who stayed on at private schools to study upper-secondary education did not 
change. However, it is still possible that decentralization increased the proportion of pupils 
that enrolled in upper secondary education in public schools after completing their 
compulsory education in private schools.  
The main result of note contained in this table is that decentralization had a positive 
impact both on male and female survival rates not including VT pupils, although the speed 
with which this impact was felt varied. However, when vocational training pupils are 
included in the survival rate measure, we see that decentralization only affected the male 
survival rate.  
 
7. Robustness analysis 
 
In this section we run a number of additional regressions in order to show the 
robustness of the results presented above. First, we estimate the linear matching differences-in-
differences specification of the outcomes equation, i.e., we include in our regression function 
the control variables considered above as possible determinants of educational attainment: 
 
it i t it it itY d Xθ α β ε= Φ + + + +  (6) 
 
where itX  is the matrix of control variables, which also includes the lagged dependent 
variable. In this way, we can corroborate that the inclusion or otherwise of these variables 
does not affect the estimated impact of decentralization on the survival rate. As explained in 
greater detail above, this is because inclusion within the decentralization process did not 
depend on these variables, so that their omission in the outcomes equation does not affect 
the estimated decentralization parameter. However, we do need to take into account that 
the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the regression analysis introduces a source 
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of endogeneity into our equation. In order to solve this problem, we instrument the lagged 
dependent variable after differencing equation (6), using as an instrument the second lag of 
the dependent variable, as suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1982). As before, we 
compute robust variance estimates and conduct our estimations by clustering the error 
term by autonomous communities. 
Finally, we estimate the so called random trend model specification. The main advantage of 
this alternative specification is that each region is allowed to have its own time trend, which 
allows us to relax the more restrictive assumption of the differences-in-differences model of 
common macroeconomic effects. Thus, the outcome equation to be estimated in this case 
is: 
 
it i t i it itY t dθ ψ α ε= Φ + + + +  (7) 
 
The results of these analyses are presented in Table 6. If we look at columns 1, 3 and 5, 
we can see that our results for the effects of decentralization on the survival rate without VT 
are robust. We find that decentralization had a positive and significant effect on the survival 
rate without VT independently of the specification that we use. In column 5, where we also 
included the interaction terms, we observe that the richer the region is, the greater the 
effects of decentralization are. We can see that both the differences-in-differences specification 
(Table 3) and the linear matching with differences-in-differences specification (Table 6, column 1) 
present exactly the same value of the parameter of the decentralization variable. Rather, the 
specification that allows for specific regional time trends provides us with a slightly higher 
parameter value. However, as pointed out by Heckman and Hotz (1989), we should not 
expect exactly the same estimated parameter from alternative non-experimental methods, 
since they are based on different assumptions regarding the distribution of the differences 
between regions. Thus, the key point here is that alternative methods lead us to the same 
conclusions regarding the benefits of decentralization.  
Similarly, the effects of decentralization on the survival rate with VT that we obtain with 
these alternative specifications are the same as those recorded before. In columns 2, 4 and 
6 of Table 6 we see that, while the single dummy variable is unable to capture the negative 
impact of decentralization in either the random trend model or the linear matching with differences-
in-differences, it does do so when the interaction terms are included in the regression. Thus, 
although we do not obtain significant effects in some specifications, the results seem to 
point to the conclusion that decentralization had a negative impact on the survival rate 
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measure which includes vocational training pupils. However, the results are not as clear in 
the case of the survival rate measure which does not include VT pupils.  
We can observe the impact of school inputs on the survival rate in columns 1 and 2. As 
we can see, the coefficient of the per capita income variable is positive and significant, as we 
would expect if we take into account the previous evidence reported in this field. However, 
the pupil/teacher ratio, the schooling variable, the unemployment rate and the first lag of the 
dependent variable are not significant. Although these results seem to confirm previous 
evidence as to which inputs matter when explaining educational outcomes, caution should 
be exercised before drawing any definitive conclusions. It should be borne in mind that the 
coefficients of the input variables would be biased if other inputs, correlated with those 
that were included, had been omitted. Given the difficulty of specifying an outcome 
equation which includes all relevant family and school inputs, we should not rule out the 
possible existence of omitted variables. Further, other endogeneity problems might serve to 
bias the coefficients of these variables. However, we are confident that the omission of 
input variables or their endogeneity does not affect the estimator of the effect of 
decentralization, i.e., the one which concerns us here.   
 
8. Conclusions  
 
The effects of decentralization on the productive efficiency of government remain 
unclear in the theoretical literature, which tends to emphasise the trade-offs between 
potential benefits and drawbacks. However, until recently, very few empirical studies had 
attempted to examine these trade-offs. At a time when decentralization policies are on the 
agenda of many countries and figure among the main recommendations emanating from 
international organizations, we considered it timely to offer some insights into this 
problem. Specifically, we have focused on the impact of decentralization on educational 
outcomes in Spain, although a similar analysis could be extended to other areas of public 
policy.  
As we have seen, the decentralization process in education started at the beginning of 
the eighties, when educational powers were devolved to Cataluña, País Vasco, Galicia, 
Andalucía, Comunidad Valenciana and Canarias. The fact that the other autonomous 
regions had to wait until the end of the nineties to receive the same powers enables us to 
use these non-decentralized regions as the control group and so estimate the effects of 
decentralization. Although it is our belief that the selection process was not influenced by 
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regional characteristics, which in turn might also have influenced the evolution of 
educational outcomes, we use the differences-in-differences method to estimate the effects of 
decentralization. In this way, we are able to control not only for the temporary shocks that 
affect the outcomes of all regions equally (such as central government reform), but also for 
the non-observable characteristics of the regions that may influence the evolution of their 
educational outcomes and which could result in differences between the treatment and 
comparison group before decentralization.  
According to our analysis, decentralization in Spain increased the survival rate (when 
pupils enrolled on vocational training programmes are not included) by more than 1.6 
percent on average. When we allow the effects to differ in accordance with the observable 
characteristics of the regions, we see that this effect increases with the per capita income of 
the region - the difference in the effect on rich and poor regions being more than one 
percent. However, decentralization had a negative or non-significant impact on the survival 
rate when vocational training pupils were included. This result appears to be attributable to 
the fact that less attention has traditionally been dedicated to vocational training 
programmes in Spain. While it is true that in recent years politicians have shown more 
concern for vocational training programmes, in response to increasing evidence regarding 
the shortfall in the number of skilled workers in the Spanish labour market, this was not 
the case during the period analysed. These results might be interpreted as evidence of the 
better match between the preferences of the public and educational policies under a 
decentralized system, since vocational training programmes in Spain remain comparatively 
unattractive.   
When the effects of decentralisation are allowed to depend on the number of years that 
have transpired since the devolution of powers to region and on the specific wave of 
decentralization, we obtain a broader view of how these effects worked. The main 
conclusion we draw is that the effects of decentralization were greater at the end of the 
nineties than at the beginning of the eighties, which may in part reflect the experience 
acquired by autonomous governments in the implementation of their educational 
competences. Moreover, although the effects take longer to be noticed at the end of the 
nineties, they are increasing over time. We also observe that the negative impact of 
decentralization on the survival rate when VT students were included only occurred at the 
end of the nineties, and was seen to disappear after three years under a decentralised 
system.  
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Our analysis of the effects of decentralization by institutional type showed that 
educational outcomes were only affected in the case of public schools, despite the fact that 
most private schools in Spain are publicly funded. However, this does not mean that the 
decentralization process had no effect on educational attainment in private schools, just 
that the proportion of students who remained in these institutions to study upper 
secondary education did not alter. Thus, it would be interesting to analyze whether 
decentralization had an impact on other measures of educational attainment in lower 
secondary education in private schools.  
When analysing the effects of decentralization by sex, we found that devolution had a 
positive impact both on male and on female survival rates when vocational training pupils 
were not included. However, when vocational training pupils were included in the survival 
rate measure, we found that decentralization only affected the male survival rate.  
Finally, in the last section we were able to corroborate the robustness of our results by 
using two alternative models that enabled us to relax some of the assumptions needed for 
the differences-in-differences estimator to be consistent. We first estimated the linear matching with 
differences-in-differences model, which involved adding the variables that are considered as 
being the determinants of educational attainment to our previous specification. Second, we 
specified a random trend model thereby relaxing the hypothesis that the regions respond in the 
same way to a macroeconomic shock. Both specifications allow us to corroborate the 
conclusions outlined above, namely, that the decentralization process in Spain has had a 
positive impact on the survival rate without VT, and that the richer the region, the more 
marked this effect was.  
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Table 1. Statutes of Autonomy and educational transfer decrees  
      
  Autonomous Community Statutes of Autonomy Constitutional Laws 
Educational transfers  
decrees 
  Andalucía 6/1981  3936/1982 
  Aragón  8/1982  1982/1998 
  Asturias  7/1981 2081/1999 
  Baleares  2/1983 1876/1997 
  Canarias  10/1982 2091/1983 
  Cantabria  8/1981 2671/1998 
  Castilla y León  4/1983 1340/1999 
  Castilla La Mancha  9/1982 1844/1999 
  Cataluña  4/1979 2809/1980 
  Extremadura  1/1983 1801/1999 
  Galicia  1/1981 1763/1982 
  Madrid  3/1983 926/1999 
  Murcia  4/1982 938/1999 
  Navarra  13/1982  1070/1990 
  País Vasco  3/1979  2808/1980 
  La Rioja  3/1982  1826/1998 
  C. Valenciana  5/1982  2093/1983 
   
Source: Boletín Oficial del Estado (BOE) 
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Table 2. Analysis of differences between treated and comparison regions in 1980. 
    
Treated Group Comparison Group   Variables 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Difference 
  Survival rate without VT (Public schools) 74.79 5.41 74.45 5.86 -0.33
  Survival rate without VT (Private schools) 76.63 5.55 77.01 8.58 0.37
  Survival rate without VT (All schools) 75.48 4.01 75.51 4.45 0.02
  Survival rate with VT (Public schools) 72.36 5.64 73.84 9.93 1.48
  Survival rate with VT (Private schools) 52.04 12.53 55.91 11.11 3.86
  Survival rate with VT (All schools) 64.88 2.82 66.62 5.02 1.74
  Pupil-teacher ratio (Public schools) 16.91 1.16 16.88 1.14 -0.04
  Pupil-teacher ratio (Private schools) 14.99 2.82 14.34 1.81 -0.65
  Pupil-teacher ratio (All schools) 16.29 1.23 15.93 0.97 -0.36
  Per capita income 4.58 0.76 4.46 0.80 -0.12
  Schooling 6.36 1.57 6.91 1.72 0.55
  Unemployment rate 11.04 5.48 9.04 3.18 -1.99
      
Note: In the treated group we include Cataluña, País Vasco, Galicia, Andalucía, Valencia and Canarias, while the remaining 
communities are included in the comparison group. The column labelled ‘difference’ records the difference in mean 
between the treated and the comparison group for each variable. We conducted a t-test on the equality of means; *, ** and 
*** indicate that the difference is significant at the 90, 95 and 99% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3. Regression analysis  
     
 
Differences-in-differences Differences-in-differences           with interaction terms 
 Without VT With VT Without VT With VT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
   Decentralization dummy 1.652 -0.850 0.109 -1.959 
 (0.60)** (0.72) (0.99) (0.96)* 
     
   Decent. x income   0.373 0.336 
   (0.18)* (0.23) 
     
   Decent. x public revenues   -0.845 -1.203 
   (0.72) (1.76) 
     
   Temporal Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
     
   R-squared 0.227 0.258 0.228 0.259 
     
   Number of observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 
     
Note: *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 90, 95 and 99% levels, respectively. We 
estimate equation (2) in first differences, by pooled OLS. Our data base is a panel data set which includes the 
50 provinces of Spain for the period 1978-2005. The dependent variable is the survival rate, “without VT” 
when it does not includes pupils that enrol on vocational training programmes upon completion of their 
compulsory education, and “with VT” when these pupils are included. The decentralization variable is 
defined with a dummy which takes the values 1, when the province i is in a decentralized autonomous region 
at time t, and 0 otherwise. Control variables are not included in the regression, so that the estimated effect 
corresponds to the differences-in-differences estimator of the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET). 
Temporal Fixed Effects are included in all the specifications; “Yes” means that they are jointly significant, 
and “No” means that they are not significant. The error terms are clustered at the Autonomous Community 
level and the variance covariance matrix estimate is robust.   
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Table 4. Alternative measures of decentralization 
       
 
1 set of indicators 2 set of indicators 
 djit Treated_80jit Treated_90jit 
 Without VT With VT Without VT With VT Without VT With VT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
   Year of decentralization 1.643 -0.958 2.006 0.003 1.268 -2.005 
 (0.58)** (0.71) (0.96)* (0.82) (0.83) (1.59) 
   1 year after decent. 1.320 -2.156 1.190 -0.296 1.326 -4.312 
 (0.62)** (0.89)** (1.29) (1.09) (1.23) (1.57)** 
   2 years after decent. 1.603 -2.354 1.758 0.068 1.373 -5.162 
 (0.80)* (1.06)** (1.16) (1.19) (1.24) (2.00)** 
   3 years after decent. 1.906 -1.773 1.199 0.630 2.673 -4.324 
 (1.32) (1.15) (2.20) (1.54) (0.92)** (2.38)* 
   4 years after decent. 2.347 -1.571 0.536 -0.876 4.290 -2.277 
 (0.91)** (1.05) (1.22) (1.84) (1.19)*** (2.75) 
   5 years after decent. 2.965 -0.321 1.963 1.342 4.086 -1.902 
 (1.09)** (1.01) (1.35) (1.93) (1.42)** (2.78) 
       
   Temporal Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
       
   R-squared 0.228 0.262 0.233 0.271 0.233 0.271 
       
   Number of observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
       
Note: *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 90, 95 and 99% levels, respectively. We estimate equation 
(2) in first differences, by pooled OLS. Our data base is a panel data set which includes the 50 provinces of Spain for the 
period 1978-2005. The dependent variable is the survival rate, “without VT” when it does not includes pupils that enrol on 
vocational training programmes upon completion of their compulsory education, and “with VT” when these pupils are 
included. The decentralization is measured with a set of J indicators in columns 1 and 2, which take the values 1 when a 
region has been decentralized exactly j years before if j=1,2,…J-1, or when a region has been decentralized j or more years 
before if j=J; in columns 3 to 6 decentralization is measured with two sets of dummies which distinguish between regions 
that were decentralized at the beginning of the eighties and the regions that were decentralized at the end of the nineties. 
Control variables are not included in the regression. Temporal Fixed Effects are included in all the specifications; “Yes” 
means that they are jointly significant, and “No” means that they are not significant. The error terms are clustered at the 
Autonomous Community level and the variance covariance matrix estimate is robust.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37
Table 5. Effects of decentralization by sex and by type of institution 
 All Schools Public Schools 
 Without VT With VT Without VT With VT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A. Male survival rate      
     
   Year of decentralization 1.825 -1.322 1.816 -2.765 
 (1.16) (1.21) (1.04)* (1.41)* 
   1 year after decent. 1.482 -2.383 2.013 -3.275 
 (1.03) (1.47) (1.14)* (1.35)** 
   2 years after decent. 1.988 -2.763 2.924 -3.536 
 (1.49) (1.48)* (1.78) (1.49)** 
   3 years after decent. 1.786 -1.490 2.716 -2.485 
 (1.82) (1.20) (2.45) (2.41) 
   4 years after decent. 2.946 -1.511 4.558 -2.498 
 (1.23)** (1.24) (1.56)** (1.94) 
   5 years after decent. 1.773 -1.485 2.085 -2.794 
 (1.59) (1.44) (1.90) (1.57)* 
     
Panel B. Female survival rate      
     
   Year of decentralization 1.483 -0.491 0.914 -1.526 
 (0.49)*** (0.91) (0.78) (1.56) 
   1 year after decent. 1.181 -1.918 1.542 -2.254 
 (0.70) (1.11) (1.06) (1.73) 
   2 years after decent. 1.340 -1.872 2.431 -1.495 
 (0.67)* (1.37) (1.08)** (2.01) 
   3 years after decent. 1.954 -1.983 3.216 -1.363 
 (1.27) (1.49) (1.72)* (2.78) 
   4 years after decent. 1.936 -1.499 3.347 -2.381 
 (1.09)* (1.50) (1.45)** (1.95) 
   5 years after decent. 4.106 1.061 5.561 1.048 
 (1.65)** (1.93) (2.14)** (2.58) 
     
Note: *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 90, 95 and 99% levels, respectively. We estimate 
equation (2) in first differences, by pooled OLS. Our data base is a panel data set which includes the 50 provinces of 
Spain for the period 1978-2005. The dependent variable is the male survival rate in Panel A and the female survival rate 
in Panel B. In columns 1 and 2 we compute the survival rate in all schools (public and private), “without VT” when 
it does not includes pupils that enrol on vocational training programmes upon completion of their compulsory 
education, and “with VT” when these pupils are included; and in columns 3 and 4 the survival rate in public 
schools, also “without VT” and “with VT”. The decentralization is measured with a set of J indicators in columns 1 
and 2, which take the values 1 when a region has been decentralized exactly j years before if j=1,2,…J-1, or when a 
region has been decentralized j or more years before if j=J; in columns 3 to 6 decentralization is measured with two 
sets of dummies which distinguish between regions that were decentralized at the beginning of the eighties and the 
regions that were decentralized at the end of the nineties. Control variables are not included in the regression. 
Temporal and Regional Fixed Effects are included in all the specifications; “Yes” means that they are jointly 
significant, and “No” means that they are not significant. The error terms are clustered at the Autonomous 
Community level and the variance covariance matrix estimate is robust.   
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Table 6. Robustness analysis. 
       
 Linear Matching          
differences-in-differences Random Trend Model 
Random Trend Model        
with interaction terms 
 Without VT With VT Without VT With VT Without VT With VT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
   Decentralization dummy 1.652 -0.830 2.127 -0.349 0.263 -2.225 
 (0.58)** (0.72) (0.75)** (0.82) (1.26) (1.17)* 
   Decent. x income     0.499 0.353 
     (0.22)** (0.38) 
   Decent. x public revenues     -1.433 -0.167 
     (0.87) (2.20) 
   Survival rate (-1) -0.060 -0.095     
 (0.09) (0.11)     
   Pupils per teacher ratio 0.198 0.253     
 (0.20) (0.16)     
   Income 0.547 0.396     
 (0.18)*** (0.20)*     
   Schooling 0.076 -0.082     
 (0.08) (0.12)     
   Unemployment rate 0.001 -0.021     
 (0.05) (0.04)     
       
   Temporal Fixed Effects Yes Yes - - - - 
       
   Regional Time Trends - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
       
   R-squared - - 0.162 0.153 0.164 0.154 
       
   Number of observations 1250 1250 1300 1300 1300 1300 
       
Note: *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 90, 95 and 99% levels, respectively. In columns 1 and 2 we 
estimate equation (6). Since the control variables include the lagged dependent variable we use the instrumental variables 
approach to estimate the effect of decentralization on the differenced equation, using the second lag of the dependent variable 
in levels as instrument. In columns 3 to 6 we estimate equation (7) after differencing it two times, by pooled OLS. Our data 
base is a panel data set which includes the 50 provinces of Spain for the period 1978-2005. The dependent variable is the survival 
rate, “without VT” when it does not includes pupils that enrol on vocational training programmes upon completion of their 
compulsory education, and “with VT” when these pupils are included. The decentralization variable is defined with a dummy 
which takes the values 1, when the province i is in a decentralized autonomous region at time t, and 0 otherwise. Temporal and 
Regional Fixed Effects are included in all the specifications; “Yes” means that they are jointly significant, and “No” means that 
they are not significant. The error terms are clustered at the Autonomous Community level and the variance covariance matrix 
estimate is robust.   
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